COMMENTS
POSTMARITAL SETTLEMENTS AND THE GIFT TAX
The estate tax is designed to reach the net worth of an individual at death.
In determining net worth, deductions are allowed for claims arising out of an
exchange which, if carried through during the decedent's life, would not have
depleted his estate. Thus, claims based on business transactions are deductible,
since an even exchange may be presumed. In contrast, the father who gives his
son $i,ooo in return for the son's promise to abstain from smoking, enters into
a transaction which depletes his estate without any corresponding monetary
return.
In the gift tax, the net worth concept assumes the form of this depletion
theory. Making a gift appears comparable to satisfying a claim for which the
estate tax would allow no deduction. However, it is not feasible to condition
gift tax liability solely on the basis of depletion. While it is true that where
there is no depletion there can be no gift, it is not always true that where there
is depletion, there must be a gift. This is exemplified by at least two types of
situations. First, an individual makes expenditures on himself and his family in
order to maintain a certain standard of living. Expenditures of this nature may
be termed "consumption." Second, an individual makes disbursements which
are imposed on him as a result of his day-to-day contact with other members of
society. These disbursements include those arising from taxes, thefts and tort
judgments, and may be termed "societal expenses."
Each of these situations results in a depletion; yet, in neither would it be
claimed that a gift has been made. Thus, since it must be determined in which
area a particular disbursement lies, the classification of transactions, or transfers, is of central importance in the gift tax. In comparison, the estate tax is not
concerned with whether property comprising the estate is transferred by will,
intestacy, claims of inheritance rights, or as the result of a will contest. This difference in approach and the difficulties inherent in classifying transfers are implicit in the development of the estate and gift taxes.
The estate tax of 1916 allowed the deduction from the gross estate of bona
fide claims contracted for a "fair consideration in money or money's worth."'Claims based on dower and other marital property rights were specifically
declared not deductible by the i918 act.2 This provision is consistent with the
theory of the estate tax, since dower is only a method by which property is
transferred at death. However, the courts held that an agreement in which the
'Revenue Act of 1i16, at § 2o2(b), 39 Stat. 777, 778 (igi6).
Revenue Act of i918, at § 402(b), 4o Stat. 1097 (i918). This provision was inserted for
the purpose of clarifying existing law. H.R. Rep. No. 767, 65th Cong. 2d Sess. 21 (igi8).
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wife relinquished her marital property rights in return for a specified share of her
husband's estate at his death, was supported by "fair consideration."3 Thus,
contrary to legislative intent, the courts made it possible for spouses to transform dower into a deductible claim and, in effect, to remove it from the husband's estate.
In order to nullify this judicial interpretation, the 1926 act replaced "fair
consideration" with the phrase "adequate and full consideration."4 This was
made specific by the Revenue Act of 1932, which provided that relinquishment
of marital property rights was not "adequate and full consideration."s Further,
the requirement of "adequate and full consideration" was limited to claims
founded on a "promise or agreement,"' 6 in order to make it clear that "liabilities
imposed by law or arising out of torts" 7 were deductible. Implicit in this provision was a legislative recognition of the nature of "societal expenses."
Also in 1932, Congress enacted the present comprehensive gift tax. The
statute is couched in terms of depletion theory, and provides that "where
property is transferred for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth," the excess in money value, "shall ...be deemed a
gift." 8 Consistent with this theory, the Treasury, in 1936, issued a Regulation
which exempted from the gift tax transfers made "in the ordinary course of
business." 9 These were defined as bona fide transactions, "at arm's length, and
free from donative intent. ' 1 °
The Supreme Court was faced with the task of interpreting these provisions
in the companion cases of Commissionerv. Wemyss" and Merrill v. Faks,1 each
involving the gift tax liability of transfers pursuant to a premarital property
settlement. In the Wemyss case, the taxpayer had made transfers to his prospective wife in consideration of her promise of marriage and to compensate her for
the loss of trust income granted to her by a prior husband. The Court declared
that Congress had chosen not to condition gift tax liability on so elusive a cons McCaughn v. Carver, i F. 2d 126 (C.A. 3d, 1927); Ferguson v. Dickson, Soo Fed. 96z
(C.A. 3d, 1924); Stubblefield v. United States, 6 F. Supp. 44o (Ct. Cl., 1934).
4Revenue Act of 1926, at § 3o3(a)(i), 44 Stat. 72 (1926). See Taft v. Comm'r,

304 U.S.

35', 356 (1938).

sRevenue Act of 1932, at § 804, 47 Stat. 280 (1932), now Int. Rev. Code § 812(b), 26
U.S.C.A. § 812(b) (1948); see H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong. ist Sess. 47 (1932); Sen. Rep.
No. 665, 72d Cong. ist Sess. 5o (1932).
6
Revenue Act of 1932, at § 8o5, 47 Stat. 280 (1932), now Int. Rev. Code § 812(b), 26

U.S.C.A. § 812(b) (1948).
7 H.R. Rep. No. 708, 72d Cong. ist Sess. 48 (1932); Sen. Rep. No. 665, 72d Cong., ist Sess.
5i (1932). It should be noted that dower is not a liability imposed by law, but only a method
of transfer imposed by law.
8RevenueAct of 1932, at § 503,47 Sta. 47 (1932), now Int.Rev. Code § 1002, 26 U.S.C.A.
§ 1002 (1948).
9Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 8 (1936), now Treas. Reg. ioS, § 86.8 (1943).
zo Ibid.

xx
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cept as donative intent. 3 Rather, it had devised the more objective standard of
taxing, in a non-business transaction, the excess in money value of the transfer
over the money value of the consideration. The Court argued that the purpose
of this definition of gift was to "reach those transfers which are withdrawn
from the donor's estate,"' 4 and thus that the test of "adequate and full consideration" must be financial benefit to the transferor and not merely detriment
to the transferee. Therefore, since marriage is a consideration not reducible to a
money value, 5 and the prospective wife's relinquishment of trust income was
merely detriment to the transferee, the Court held that the Wemyss transfers
were taxable gifts.
In the Fahscase, the taxpayer had made transfers to his prospective wife in
consideration of her relinquishment of marital property rights. The majority
bypassed the taxpayer's contention that this relinquishment was a consideration
reducible to money value and of financial benefit to him. 6 It argued that the
estate and gift taxes were to be construed together,Y7 and since relinquishment
of marital property rights is not "adequate and full consideration" for purposes
of the estate tax, neither is it for purposes of the gift tax. Finally, having found
that the Faks, like the Wemyss, transfers were not made "in the ordinary course
of business,"' the Court held them to be taxable gifts.
The Faks and Wemyss decisions expressly adopted a depletion theory as the
basis of gift tax liability. It should be noted that the transactions before the
Court were not complicated by elements of "consumption" or "societal" expenses. Once the Court had rejected the test of donative intent, it was faced
with only a depletion problem.
'3 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had declared: "A donative intent followed
by a donative act is essential to constitute a gift; and no strained and artificial construction of
a supplementary statute should be indulged to tax as a gift a transfer actually lacking donative intent." Wemyss v. Comm'r, i44 F. 2d 78, 82 (C.A. 2d, 1944).
z4 Commissioner v. Wemyss, 324 U.S. 303, 307 (1945).
"sThe Supreme Court declared that Treas. Reg. 79, Art. 8 (1936), now Treas. Reg. ioS,
§ 86.8 (1943), correctly interpreted § 5o3 (now Int. Rev. Code § 1002) of the gift tax. The
Regulation reads: "A consideration not reducible to a money value, as love and affection,
promise of marriage, etc., is to be wholly disregarded, and the entire value of the property
transferred constitutes the amount of the gift."
16 Reed, J., dissenting, stated: "Through the tables of mortality, the value of a survivor's
right in a fixed sum receivable at the death of a second party may be adequately calculated.
...The trial court thus found the present value of the release of the taxpayer's estate from the
wife's survivorship rights largely exceeded the amount paid by the taxpayer. ." 324 U.S.
308, 314 (1945).
7Following Estate of Sanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39 (1939).
"8The Court brushed this contention aside summarily and declared: "To find that the
transaction was 'made in the ordinary course of business' is to attribute to the Treasury a
strange use of English." 324 U.S. 3o8, 313 n. i (z945). To be contrasted with this is the statement made by Judge Disney of the Tax Court, dissenting in Taurog v Comm'r, ii T.C. Xo16,

1025-26 (r948): "Though... sweethearts may, romantically speaking, be thought not to

deal 'at arm's length,' in any realistic business sense the transfers between them in the
Wemyss and Merrill v. Fahs cases were... precisely the antithesis of gifts in the ordinary
sense.. . . Sweethearts wishing to make gifts do not coldly require quid pro quo.....'!
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Previous to the Supreme Court's decisions in the Faks and Wemyss cases, the
Tax Court had held, in Jones v. Comm'r,x9 that transfers pursuant to a predivorce settlement were not taxable gifts, on the grounds that they were made
in satisfaction of the wife's right to support. The court argued that since the
parties had dealt at arm's length, without donative intent, it would be presumed
that the sum agreed upon reflected the actual value of these support rights, and
thus that the transfers were founded on "adequate and full consideration."
Since, by law, the husband is obligated to support his wife, spouses may be
considered a consuming unit. Expenditures of this nature, made by the husband
during coverture, fall in the class of "consumption expenses" rather than in
the class of gifts. Consequently, the transfer of a lump sum in satisfaction of the
wife's right to support, pursuant to a postmarital agreement, should not be
considered a gift, since it represents the present value of a "consumption
expense."
In cases involving pre-divorce agreements which followed the Fahs and
Wemyss decisions, the Tax Court accepted the Supreme Court's position that
it is not necessary to find donative intent in order to impose the gift tax. However, the court went on to argue that where it was apparent, in a divorce situation, that the parties had not acted with such intent, there could not be a taxable gift.20
This Regulation accepted the Tax
The Treasury then issued E.T.
Court's position as to support rights, but stated that relinquishment of marital
property rights was not to be considered the "adequate and full consideration"
necessary to exempt a transfer from the gift tax. The Tax Court repudiated this
J9.21

distinction and refused to follow the ruling.22

Another analysis of the divorce situation was developed in the 1947 case of
Commissionerv. Converse.23 The divorce court had rejected the separation agreement made by the parties, and decreed instead a vastly different lump sum settlement. The Tax Court reiterated its argument that postmarital settlements
were arm's length transactions, and held that the Converse transfers were not
taxable gifts.24 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the Tax
Court's decision, but on decidedly different grounds.25 The appellate court
pointed out that this settlement had been litigated in the divorce action, and
that the court had decreed a settlement differing from that made by the parties.
T.C. 1207 ('943).
Converse v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945); Mitchell v. Comm'r, 6 T.C. 159 (1946).

x9 I
20

2

1946-2 Cum. Bull. 66.

- McClean v. Comm'r, IIT.C. 543 (I948); Taurog v. Comm'r, ii T.C. ioi6 (i948); Harding v. Comm'r, xi T.C. iosi (1948).
23 163 F. 2d 131 (C.A. 2d, 1947).
24Converse v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1014 (1945).
2s
The appellate court declared: "We find no occasion to attempt to resolve the dispute in
[the Tax Court] as to any distinction between antenuptial and postnuptial agreements ..
63 F. 2d 3I, 133 (C.A. 2d, 1947).
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It therefore held that the Converse transfers were not taxable, since they were
effectuated by the court's decree rather than by the agreement of the parties.
Payments pursuant to divorce decrees were thus included in the class of "societal expenses."
In late i95o, the problem of imposing the gift tax on transfers pursuant to
divorce agreements finally reached the Supreme Court, in the case of Harris v.
ComMI'r. 2 6 The taxpayer and her husband had entered into a property settle-

ment, the execution of which was conditioned upon a decree of absolute divorce
between the parties in their then pending Nevada action. By the terms of this
settlement, each spouse agreed to transfer to the other property of substantial
value, and to release completely the property of the other from all claims arising
out of their marriage. Although the parties provided that their agreement
should be submitted to the divorce court for its approval, they made the further
proviso, which the divorce court specifically adopted, that the covenants in their
agreement should survive any decree of divorce which might be entered. The
value of the property transferred to the husband exceeded that received by the
wife by more than $ioo,ooo, which amount the Commissioner attempted to tax
as a gift.
It is not surprising that the Court split five to four, since each of three divergent lines of precedent was applicable to the Harrissituation: i) the depletion rationale of the Fahsand Wemyss cases; 2) the business transaction analogy
of the Tax Court; 3) the "societal expense" theory of the Converse decision.
The majority opinion accepted the theory of the Converse case. It contended
that the decree of the divorce court is not a "promise or agreement." Therefore,
since the requirement of "adequate and full consideration" is limited to transfers effectuated by a "promise or agreement," the majority held that the Harris
transfers fell outside the scope of gift tax liability. The Court bolstered this
position with an argument like that previously advanced by the Tax Court.
It declared that divorce is like the dissolution of a partnership, and since the unscrambling of such business interests would be tax exempt as a transaction "in
the ordinary course of business," "[n]o reason is apparent why husband and
wife should be under a heavier handicap, absent a statute which brings all
' 7
marital property settlements under the gift tax." "
Speaking for the minority, Justice Frankfurter, who had written the Fahsand
Wemyss opinions, declared that the Harrissettlement was no more a business
transaction than the premarital agreements taxed in those cases. He further
contended that, since the parties had stipulated that the covenants in their
agreement should survive the divorce decree, these transfers were founded on a
"promise or agreement" rather than on a court decree.25 Finally, Justice Frank26340 U.S. 1O6 (i95o).

27 Ibid., at iog.

"One of the transfers required by the agreement... was not incorporated into the
divorce decree and therefore is presumably enforceable only under the contract. If enforceability under the decree is the criterion, a gift tax is due to the extent this indebtedness is reflected in the amount determined by the Commissioner to represent the value attributable
to release of marital rights." Ibid., at 188 n. 3. Consult text, infra, at note 29.
28
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furter argued that the Harris transfers, like those in the Faks and Wemyss
cases, depleted the estate of the transferor, and should be subject to the gift
tax.
The Harriscase by no means solves all the gift tax problems 9 which confront
a lawyer when he arranges a divorce settlement. Unanswered is the question of
whether it is sufficient merely to incorporate the agreement in the decree. It
would appear, from the Tax Court's interpretation of the Harris case in McMurtry v. Comm'r,30 that this in itself will not suffice. Rather, execution of the
agreement must be expressly conditioned upon entry of the decree.
In addition, the Harriscase gives no indication as to whether any settlement
between the parties which is conditioned upon and incorporated in a divorce
decree will be exempted from the gift tax. In some jurisdictions the divorce
courts are not empowered to compel a settlement of marital property rights between the parties. The Illinois courts, for example, are limited to a decree of
support rights; they "may make such order touching the alimony and maintenance of the wife or husband, the care, custody and support of the children, or
any of them as, from the circumstances of the parties and the nature of the case,
shall be fit, reasonable and just."3* This does not prevent the court from incorporating in its decree a settlement made by the parties greater than it could
legally compel. The Commissioner might well maintain that the difference is a
taxable gift. Hooker v. Comm'rV offers support to this position. In this case,
the divorce court incorporated in its decree, a separation agreement which in
part provided for support of the taxpayer's minor children. In holding that the
difference between the amount decreed and the value of these support rights
was a taxable gift, the Tax Court argued that "[a] divorce court would certainly
not prevent a father from making greater provision for his minor children than
the minimum required by law or more than the court could require."33 The Tax
29The Harris situation involves a number of income tax problems. The decision encourages
lump sum divorce settlements, since a husband may transfer property free from the gift tax
(upon complying with certain conditions), and his wife may receive it free from the income tax.
Gould v. Gould, 245 U.S. 151 (1917).
Should the Commissioner attempt to tax as income to the husband the property which he
received in the Harris settlement, the husband might claim (i) that he received it in lieu of
curtesy, which is exemptfrom theincome tax, Int. Rev. Code § 22(b)( 3 ), 26 U.S.C.A. §22(b)(3)
(z949), or (2) that even though this transfer was not a gift within the gift tax definition, it was
one for purposes of the income tax, and thus not income taxable to him. Ibid.
In Farid-Es-Sultaneh v. Comm'r, 16o F. 2d 812 (C.A. 2d, 1947), it was held that the gift
and income taxes were not to be construed together, and therefore, that the definition of gift
was not the same for both taxes. However, under this decision, the gift tax definition is broader.
In the Fahs case it was held that that transfers pursuant to an antenuptial settlement, in consideration of the relinquishment of marital rights in the transferor's property, was a taxable
gift. The Sultaneh opinion declared that such relinquishment, though not "adequate and full
consideration" for the gift tax, was "fair consideration" for purposes of the income tax. Thus, in
the Harris situation, the husband may have received a taxable gain if the value of his relinquishment was less than the difference between the market value of the property transferred to
him, and his basis for the property transferred in return.
30 2 CCH Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep.
x8,o56 (T.C., i95z).
3' Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 40,
32io T.C. 388 (1948).

§ 19.
33Ibid.,

at 392.
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Court further declared that it would not presume that Congress "intended to
pass a law which could be circumvented by the clever process of entering into
an agreement to make a transfer, supported by an inadequate money consideration, and then making a transfer to satisfy a judgment on the agreement."34
In essence, this approach requires that a court look behind the decree in order
to determine whether a taxable gift has been made. This was the view taken by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Markwell's Estate v. Comm'r,3S
when it held that a claim founded on inadequate money consideration was not
deductible from the gross estate, even though it had been reduced to a judgment.
However, if a court must look behind the decree, further complications arise.
First, the incidence of the gift tax would be made largely dependent on local
law. This, in turn, would offer spouses additional incentive to seek divorce in
the most favorable forum. Second, this approach necessarily involves a determination of what is meant by the "power" of a divorce court. Does the word
"power" refer to that which a court may, by statute, formally compel, or does it
refer to that which a court can effectively enforce? For example, a divorce
court may incorporate in its decree a settlement made by a defaulting defendant, over whom the court has no jurisdiction in personam. In all probability,
settling this jurisdictional problem would necessitate a further decision by the
Supreme Court.
Another interpretation of the Harris decision is possible. In view of complexities involved in transfers incident to divorce, it may well be that the
Supreme Court intended to exempt from the'gift tax all such transfers settling
the rights between the parties, when made under the aegis of a divorce decree.
On the other hand, the Harrisdecision, by implicitly rejecting E.T. 19,36 discarded a theory which offers a satisfactory solution to the problem of taxing
postmarital property settlements. Following the Treasury regulation would result in a consistent treatment of dower interests, whether transferred previous
to marriage, incident to divorce or at death.37
At any rate, in order to circumvent the problems of the divorce situation,
legislative intervention appears necessary. Either the theory of E.T. 19 must be
incorporated in the gift tax, or divorce must be treated as an anomalous situation with rules of its own.
34Ibid.

(C.A. 7 th, 1940).
the transfer sought to be taxed in the Harris case passed to the husband from the
wife, who was under no obligation to support him, the problems involved in the distinction
made by the Treasury Regulation between support and marital property rights was not before
the Court. See Frankfurter, J., dissenting, 340 U.S. io6, iio n. i (ig5o).
37In a divorce situation the wife may refuse to accept the sum offered to her in lieu of
dower, and instead elect to receive her statutory share at her husband's death. Since, in the
latter situation, this dower interest would be taxed, it is arguable that a transfer of such interests pursuant to a divorce agreement should also be taxed.
3S112 F. 2d 253
36Since

